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Abstract— This paper characterizes safe following distances
for on-road driving when vehicles can avoid collisions by either
braking or by swerving into an adjacent lane. In particular,
we focus on safety as defined in the Responsibility-Sensitive
Safety (RSS) framework. We extend RSS by introducing swerve
manoeuvres as a valid response in addition to the already
present brake manoeuvre. These swerve manoeuvres use the
more realistic kinematic bicycle model rather than the double
integrator model of RSS. When vehicles are able to swerve and
brake, it is shown that their required safe following distance at
higher speeds is less than that required through braking alone.
In addition, when all vehicles follow this new distance, they are
provably safe. The use of the kinematic bicycle model is then
validated by comparing these swerve manoeuvres to that of a
dynamic single-track model.
I. INTRODUCTION
The main bottleneck for the public acceptance and ubiq-
uity of autonomous driving is the current lack of safety
guarantees. There are three main ways to establish the safety
of an autonomous vehicle. The first involves measuring
crash statistics over a large number of autonomously driven
kilometres and comparing them to the equivalent human rates
for each category of collision severity. However, particularly
with severe collisions, the number of kilometres required to
establish a statistically significant collision rate renders this
method impractical for establishing safety.
An alternative method for determining the safety of a sys-
tem is through scenario-based verification [1]. This method
uses a set of scenarios that validate the vehicle’s behaviour
across a representative set of situations. The goal is for the set
of scenarios to capture most of the required driving behaviour
necessary for safe driving. However, it is difficult to construct
such a set of scenarios that captures all of the challenging
conditions faced by an autonomous vehicle [2].
A third approach for verifying the safety of a system is
formally proving the behaviour of a vehicle is safe [3]–
[6]. In order to compute useful safety bounds, these works
often include simplifying assumptions. The difficulty with
this method lies in selecting reasonable assumptions to make.
Generally, the stronger the assumptions made, the easier to
prove the system is safe. However, if the assumptions are too
strong, they may not hold in general driving scenarios. An
additional challenge with this method is that to prove safety,
the driving behaviour may need to be conservative, or highly
restrictive.
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Fig. 1: (a) The standard RSS braking manoeuvre for a braking
leading vehicle. Velocity and acceleration arrows point to path
segments where they occur. (b) The proposed swerve manoeuvre
for a leading braking vehicle. The green dot represents the lateral
clearance distance yc required by RSS. (c) The braking manoeuvre
required for a swerving leading vehicle. (d) The swerving manoeu-
vre required for a swerving leading vehicle.
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This paper aims to address the latter issue, especially
as it pertains to the Responsibility-Sensitive Safety (RSS)
framework [5]. Fundamental to the RSS framework is its
assumption of responsibility, and that vehicles have a duty of
care to one another. The assumption of responsible behaviour
allows for the autonomous vehicle to make meaningful
progress in the driving task. Under other frameworks that
assume adversarial vehicles, the autonomous vehicle often
exhibits over-conservative behaviour that impedes progress.
This assumption of responsible behaviour allows for the
computation of safe following distances such that vehicles
can comfortably brake for a braking vehicle in front of them,
without causing a collision. This following distance is a
function of both vehicle’s speeds and maximum accelera-
tions, as well as the reacting vehicle’s reaction time. When
computing this following distance, the vehicles are modeled
by a kinematic particle model. As long as this following
distance is maintained by all vehicles, no collisions can
occur.
This paper extends this framework to include swerve
manoeuvres feasible for the kinematic bicycle model as a
valid response, in addition to the standard braking response.
In doing so, vehicles are able to follow at closer following
distances at higher speeds, allowing for more efficient use of
the road network. Using swerve manoeuvres feasible for the
kinematic bicycle model ensures that these manoeuvres are
more realistic than those possible under the particle model
used in RSS.
A. Contributions
The contributions in this paper are as follows. The first
is the derivation of safe following distances in scenarios
where vehicles perform swerve manoeuvres. In addition to
the scenario of braking for a braking vehicle considered
in RSS, we consider the additional scenarios of swerving
for a braking vehicle, braking for a swerving vehicle, and
swerving for a swerving vehicle. These distances are then
used to form a novel extension of the RSS framework: a
shorter following distance at high speeds. When all vehicles
in a road network follow this new distance as well the rest
of the RSS framework, and satisfy our assumptions, they are
provably safe from collision.
The second contribution is a validation of our use of the
kinematic bicycle model by comparing our swerve manoeu-
vres to manoeuvres generated under a dynamic single-track
model [7]. As part of this dynamic model, we include a Pace-
jka tire model [8] to account for road surface traction. We
show that the kinematic model, when lateral acceleration is
constrained, can accurately estimate the longitudinal distance
required to perform swerve manoeuvres using the dynamic
model.
B. Related Work
Previous work on swerve manoeuvres for autonomous
driving have often focused on feasible manoeuvres according
to various kinodynamic models [9]. In particular, many of
these papers have assumed some variant of the bicycle
model [10]–[13] and performed optimization to generate
optimal swerve manoeuvres. However, under these models
the optimal solution is not generated through a closed form
solution, which makes formally proving safety challenging.
Other work has instead simplified the vehicle model to a
point mass model [14]–[16] in order to yield closed form,
optimal solutions. However, this comes at the cost of the
nonholonomic constraint present in the bicycle model, which
result in manoeuvres that would be unrealistic for a car to
execute. The goal with this work is to yield closed form,
feasible solutions to swerve manoeuvre boundary condition
problems, while still preserving the kinematic constraints that
allow the manoeuvre to be executable by a real vehicle.
Previous work on using the kinematic bicycle model for
autonomous driving has shown it is an effective model for
tracking trajectories in MPC [17], and as such, contains
important kinematic constraints that capture some of the
limits of vehicle motion. Past work has also shown that
the kinematic bicycle model is an accurate approximation to
vehicle motion at low accelerations [18], which we expect
to see as well in our validation.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Responsibility-Sensitive Safety (RSS)
In this paper, we rely on two aspects of the RSS frame-
work; the longitudinal and lateral safe distances required
between two vehicles. In particular, we examine how the
equivalent longitudinal safe distance for a swerve manoeuvre
compares to that of a brake manoeuvre, while maintaining
an appropriate lateral safe distance when required. In this
work, we compare swerve manoeuvres moving to the left as
in Figure 1, however, the same analysis can be applied to
swerves moving to the right.
In RSS, safe distances are a function of several variables
that describe the situation. The initial speed of the rear
autonomous vehicle is given by vr, and the initial speed
of the front vehicle is denoted by vf . The reaction time
is given by ρ. The interpretation of the reaction time is
the duration after which a vehicle can apply a mitigating
action. During the reaction time, both vehicles apply the most
dangerous acceleration possible, amax,accel, amax,brake in the
longitudinal case, and alatmax in the lateral case. To ensure
passenger comfort, as well as to prevent tailgater safety
issues, the mitigating reaction of the rear vehicle is assumed
to be a comfortable deceleration, denoted amin,brake. This
term comes from RSS, and is interpreted as the threshold
for a safe, responsible braking response for the autonomous
car. Note that these accelerations are magnitudes.
We denote the positive part of an expression with [·]+.
Velocities are signed according to Figure 1a, and accelera-
tions are unsigned parameters of the framework. If the post-
reaction speeds vr,ρ and vf,ρ are given by
vr,ρ = vr + amax,accelρ, (1)
vlatr,ρ = v
lat
r − alatmaxρ, (2)
vlatf,ρ = v
lat
f + a
lat
maxρ, (3)
the longitudinal and lateral safe distances are given by
dlong =
[
vrρ+
1
2
amax,accelρ
2+
(vr + vr,ρ)
2
2amin,brake
− v
2
f
2amax,brake
]
+
, (4)
dlat = µ+
[
−
(
vlatr + v
lat
r,ρ
2
)
ρ+
(vlatr,ρ)
2
2alatmin
+
vlatf + v
lat
f,ρ
2
ρ+
(vlatf,ρ)
2
2alatmin
]
+
. (5)
The longitudinal safe distance is between the frontmost
point of the rear vehicle and the rearmost point of the
front vehicle along the longitudinal direction, and the lateral
safe distance is between the rightmost point of the rear
vehicle and the leftmost point of the front vehicle along
the lateral direction. These are left implicit in the original
RSS formulation, but since swerves involve rotation of the
chassis, we make them explicit in this work. The longitudinal
safe distance dlong is the distance required such that the
rear vehicle can maximally accelerate during its reaction
time, then minimally decelerate to a stop, all while the front
vehicle is maximally braking, without causing a collision.
The lateral safe distance dlat is the distance required such
that both vehicles can maximally accelerate towards each
other during the reaction time ρ, then minimally decelerate
until zero lateral velocity, while still maintaining at least a
µ distance buffer.
When computing safety for swerve manoeuvres, the ve-
hicle must maintain these safe distances with other relevant
vehicles. These vehicles are relevant according to longitudi-
nal and lateral adjacency, as defined below. We denote the
vehicle dimensions df , dr, bl, br as in Figure 3a.
Definition II.1. If x1, x2 denote the longitudinal position of
each vehicle, and then the vehicles are laterally adjacent if
x2 − dr − df ≤ x1 ≤ x2 + dr + df .
Definition II.2. If y1, y2 denotes the lateral position of each
vehicle, then the vehicles are longitudinally adjacent if y2−
bl − br − dlat ≤ y1 ≤ y2 + bl + br + dlat.
Combining the definitions for safe distances and adjacency
gives us a definition of safety.
Definition II.3. A vehicle is laterally/longitudinally safe
from another vehicle if it is not laterally/longitudinally
adjacent to the other vehicle, or if it is laterally/longitudinally
adjacent to the other vehicle and there is at least dlat/dlong of
distance between them.
Definition II.4. For a swerving vehicle and a non-swerving
vehicle, as well as a given swerve manoeuvre, we define
the lateral clearance distance, yc, as the earliest point in
the swerve at which the swerving vehicle is no longer
longitudinally adjacent to the non-swerving vehicle.
(a)
(b)
Fig. 2: (a) The kinematic bicycle model, along with its associated
variables. (b) The dynamic single track model used for valida-
tion [7]. Drag forces are omitted for simplicity, but are included in
our computation.
In Figure 1, yc is reached at the green dot along the
swerve. The lateral clearance distance allows us to compute
the longitudinal distance covered by the swerve, which is
denoted by xc. We then use xc to compute the equivalent of
dlong for a swerve manoeuvre, and compare it to Equation (4).
B. Vehicle Models
The analysis in this paper relies upon three different
kinodynamic models. The first is the particle kinematic
model, which is used in the RSS framework. Through all of
these kinematic models, x is longitudinal displacement and y
is lateral displacement. The control input is the acceleration
in each dimension
x¨ = ax, y¨ = ay. (6)
When computing swerve manoeuvres, we wish to model
the non-holonomic constraints on a car’s motion to make
the manoeuvres realistic. To do so, we rely on the kinematic
bicycle model, a model commonly used in autonomous
driving [17], [19], [20]. This is illustrated in Figure 2a. In this
model, v is the velocity of the vehicle, ψ is the heading of
velocity at the centre of mass, θ is the yaw of the chassis, β
is the slip angle of the centre of mass relative to the chassis,
a is the input acceleration, δ is the input steering angle, Rc
is the turning radius of the center of mass, and lr and lf are
the distances from the rear and front axle to the centre of
mass, respectively
x˙ = v cos(ψ + β), β = tan−1
(
lr
lr + lf
tan(δ)
)
,
y˙ = v sin(ψ + β), θ = ψ − β,
θ˙ =
v tan(δ)
lr + lf
, |δ| ≤ δmax
v˙ = a, |alat| = v
2
Rc
≤ alatmin,
Rc =
lr + lf
cos(β) tan(δ)
, −abrake,min ≤ a ≤ amax. (7)
Finally, to verify our kinematic approximation is valid,
we compare our swerve manoeuvres to those executed by a
dynamic single-track vehicle model [7] with tires modelled
using the Pacejka tire model [8]. This model is shown in
Figure 2b. In this vehicle model, v, ψ, β, δ, lf , and lr
are the same as the bicycle model. The slip angles of the
front and rear tires are αf and αr, respectively. The lateral
tire forces on the front and rear tires are denoted Fsf and
Fsr, respectively, and Flf and Flr denote the longitudinal tire
forces at the front and rear tires, respectively. The drag mount
point is denoted eSP, and FAx and FAy are the longitudinal
and lateral drag forces, respectively. The yaw rate is ωz , and
ωδ is the input steering rate. The mass of the car is m, and
Izz is the inertia about the z-axis. We omit the equations of
motion for brevity, but they are presented in the reference [7].
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
The fundamental problem this paper addresses is to com-
pute the longitudinal safe distance required when there is a
free lane (or shoulder) to the left or right of the vehicle,
allowing for an evasive swerve manoeuvre. This requires
knowing the longitudinal safe distance required for the
scenarios illustrated in Figure 1. As can be seen, when
computing the longitudinal safe distances for swerves, one
needs to consider both longitudinal and lateral clearance,
since swerves involve lateral and longitudinal displacement.
Since vehicles rotate during swerves, rotation must be
compensated for when computing these clearances. After
compensating for rotation, the longitudinal swerve distance
xc can then be used to compute the longitudinal safe distance
required for a swerve. In RSS, safety was proved for a
particle model. This paper extends those results to prove the
safety for swerves feasible for the kinematic bicycle model. It
is then shown how this result can be applied to more general
models in Section V. This task then breaks down into five
subproblems.
Subproblem 1. Given the initial speed of a swerving
vehicle vr, the vehicle dimensions df , dr, bl, br as in Fig-
ure 3a, and parameters µ and ρ, compute a lateral clearance
distance yc sufficient for lateral safety when a swerving
vehicle becomes laterally adjacent to a lead vehicle.
Subproblem 2. Given the kinematic constraints in (7), the
initial vehicle speeds vr and vf , the lateral clearance distance
yc, and parameters ρ, amax, amin,brake, amax,brake, alatmax, and
alatmin, compute a longitudinal safe distance sufficient for
safety when swerving for a braking lead vehicle. This is
illustrated in Figure 1b.
Subproblem 3. Given the initial vehicle speeds vr and vf ,
the clearance point yc, and parameters ρ, amax, amin,brake,
alatmax, and a
lat
min, compute a longitudinal safe distance suffi-
cient for safety when braking for a swerving lead vehicle.
This is illustrated in Figure 1c.
Subproblem 4. Given the kinematic constraints in (7),
the initial vehicle speeds vr and vf , the parameters ρ, amax,
amin,brake, amax,brake, alatmax, and a
lat
min, compute a longitudinal
safe distance sufficient for safety when swerving behind a
swerving lead vehicle. This is illustrated in Figure 1d.
Subproblem 5. Given longitudinal safe distance sufficient
for safety when swerving for a braking vehicle, braking for
a swerving lead vehicle, and swerving for a swerving lead
vehicle, compute a longitudinal safe distance akin to dlong
that is sufficient for universal safety when maintained by all
vehicles on the road.
The first subproblem is addressed in Section IV-A, the
second in Section IV-B, the third in Section IV-C, the fourth
in Section IV-D, and the fifth in Section IV-E.
The work in this paper makes the following assumptions
on responsible behaviour:
1) A vehicle will only perform a swerve manoeuvre if it is
not braking, and will only perform a brake manoeuvre
if it is not swerving.
2) For every swerve manoeuvre, each vehicle reaches the
lateral clearance distance only once. As a result, once
a vehicle has committed to a lane change by reaching
the lateral clearance distance, it will not return to its
previous lane.
3) Each vehicle moves forward along the road, v ≥ 0 and
−pi
2 ≤ ψ ≤ pi2 .
IV. COMPUTING THE LONGITUDINAL SAFE DISTANCE
A. Lateral Clearance Distance
To compute the lateral clearance distance yc, we modify
Equation (5) to account for vehicle rotation. If we know
the maximum chassis yaw θmax during the manoeuvre, we
can compute an axis-aligned bounding rectangle as an outer
approximation to the vehicle footprint. This is useful for
safety analysis, and is illustrated in Figure 3a.
The three distances we need for safety analysis are from
the centre of mass to the front of the bounding rectangle, d′,
from the centre of mass to the side of the bounding rectangle,
b′, and from the centre of mass to the rear of the bounding
rectangle, d¯. The distances from the centre of mass to the
rear and front of the chassis are dr and df , respectively.
The distances to the left and right of the chassis are bl and
br, respectively. As the vehicle rotates, the length and width
of the bounding rectangle increases until θmax reaches the
angles from the centre of mass to the corners of the rectangle.
Further rotation past these points decreases the dimensions
of the bounding rectangle. We can write these angles in terms
of φ and γ, illustrated in Figure 3a. The equations for the
(a)
(b)
Fig. 3: (a) An outer approximation to a vehicle chassis that rotates
by θmax. The distances d′ and d¯ are used for longitudinal buffers
during swerve manoeuvres, and b′ is used as a lateral buffer. (b)
An inner approximation to a rotating vehicle chassis.
bounding rectangle distances are then d′, d¯, and b′ are
d′ =
{
df cos(θmax) + br sin(θmax) θmax ≤ φ,√
d2f + b
2
r θmax > φ,
(8)
d¯ =
{
dr cos(θmax) + bl sin(θmax) θmax ≤ γ,√
d2r + b
2
l θmax > γ,
(9)
b′ =
{
dr sin(θmax) + br cos(θmax) θmax ≤ pi2 − γ,√
d2r + b
2
r θmax >
pi
2 − γ.
(10)
We now have an expression for the bounding rectangle
distances of a rotating vehicle in terms of θmax, which is
computed in Section IV-B.
Using b′ and the lateral safe distance dlat, we can now
compute the lateral clearance distance, yc required for Sub-
problem 1.
yc = b
′ + bl + dlat. (11)
Let us denote the time yc is attained as tc.
Theorem 1. Equation (11) gives a lateral clearance distance
sufficient for lateral safety when a swerving vehicle becomes
laterally adjacent to another braking vehicle, or any time
before.
Proof. To show lateral safety, we must show that laterally
adjacent vehicles are at least dlat from one another, as given
in Equation (5). Since the swerving vehicle’s lateral speed
is variable but nonnegative, a conservative lower bound
on its lateral velocity is zero when computing dlat. From
assumption 1, since the other vehicle is braking, it is not
swerving, and therefore has zero lateral velocity during
the swerve. The required dlat can then be computed using
Equation (5), taking vlatr and v
lat
f to be zero, and using the
parameters alatmin, a
lat
max, and ρ. The distance dlat acts as a
buffer to ensure that upon reaching lateral adjacency, both
agents are laterally safe from one another.
For t < tc, the swerving vehicle is not laterally adjacent
to the other vehicle, and is laterally safe. For t ≥ tc, from
Assumption 2, tc is the time at which the two vehicles are
closest while laterally adjacent. From Equation 11, there is
at least dlat of distance between the vehicles, and thus they
are laterally safe ∀t ≥ tc.
B. Swerving for a Braking Vehicle
We can now use yc to compute the longitudinal safe
distance, ds,b, required when swerving to avoid a braking lead
vehicle. We wish to do so under the constraints of the bicycle
model outlined in Section II-A. In addition, if α denotes the
lane width, tf denotes the end time of the swerve, and the
origin of the coordinate frame is at the center line of the
current lane at the rear vehicle’s position at t = 0, we would
like the swerve to satisfy the following boundary conditions:
θ(tf ) = 0, y(tf ) = α. (12)
However, to compute the optimal swerve manoeuvre with
respect to longitudinal clearance is an optimization problem
with no closed form solution [11]. Instead, we can compute
a swerve manoeuvre feasible for the bicycle model, and use
that to obtain an upper bound on the actual longitudinal
distance required by a swerve constrained by the bicycle
model.
As in Equation (4), the lead vehicle is travelling with
velocity vf , and then brakes at amax,brake during the entire
manoeuvre. The swerve is preceded by the rear vehicle
maximally accelerating during the reaction delay ρ, at which
point it begins the swerve manoeuvre with initial speed vr,ρ.
To ensure monotonicity in the gap between the rear and lead
vehicles, a lower bound on the distance travelled until tf by
the lead vehicle is used, denoted xf .
The swerve we consider is bang-bang in the steering
input with zero longitudinal acceleration, and is illustrated
in Figure 4. We denote the longitudinal distance travelled by
the swerving vehicle until the swerving vehicle reaches the
lateral clearance distance as xc This distance xc is computed
in Equations 21 and 26.
For the swerve manoeuvre, the turning radius of the
circular arcs depends on the maximum lateral acceleration,
as well as the kinematic limits of the steering angle. The
constraints on steering angle and lateral acceleration from
(7) give two constraints on the turning radius
Rmin,δ =
√
(lr + lf )2
tan(δmax)2 + l2r
, Rmin,a =
v2r,ρ
alatmin
. (13)
To ensure both constraints are satisfied, we set Rc from (7)
to the maximum of the two. From this turning radius, we
can compute the steering angle δc and the slip angle βc
δc = tan
−1
(√
(lr + lf )2
R2c − l2r
)
, βc = tan
−1
(
lr tan(δc)
lr + lf
)
.
(14)
Fig. 4: The swerve manoeuvre used for safety analysis. The red
path is taken by the centre of mass, and the blue path is taken by
the rear axle. The distance between lanes is α, δc is the steering
angle, βc is the slip angle. The maximum angles achieved by the
chassis yaw and the velocity of the centre of mass are given by
θmax and ψmax, respectively. The turning radius of the rear axle
and centre of mass’s paths are given by Rr and Rc, respectively.
We can now compute the θmax required to satisfy the
boundary conditions in Equation (12). From the rear axle,
the two circular arcs are symmetrical in lateral distance
travelled, as in Figure 4. Therefore, we can compute the
angle along the first circular arc required to reach a lateral
distance of α2 . First, we compute the turning radius at the
rear axle, Rr
Rr =
lr + lf
tan(δc)
. (15)
The lateral distance travelled during the first circular arc is
then given by
y(t) = Rr(1− cos(θ(t))). (16)
For a given value of δc, θmax is then
θmax = cos
−1
(
1− α
2Rr
)
. (17)
To compute xc, there are two cases, depending on if yc is
reached in the first or second circular arc. We can compute
ψmax using (7). From Assumption 3, we have that ψmax ≤
pi
2 . Thus, the first case occurs if
yc ≤ Rc(cos(βc)− cos(ψmax)), (18)
otherwise the second case occurs.
1) First Circular Arc: Similar to Equation (16), the lon-
gitudinal position along the first circular arc is given by
x(t) = Rc(sin(ψ(t))− sin(βc)). (19)
We can use the centre of mass equivalent of Equation (16)
and yc to compute the ψ value at the clearance point, ψc
ψc = cos
−1
(
cos(βc)− yc
Rc
)
. (20)
Substituting this value for ψ in Equation (19) gives our
swerve longitudinal distance
xc = Rc(sin(ψc)− sin(βc)). (21)
The magnitude of the velocity is constant during the swerve,
and so we can compute tc using the arc length travelled up
to the clearance point yc,
tc =
Rc(ψc − βc)
v
. (22)
2) Second Circular Arc: In the second circular arc, we
denote the initial heading of the centre of mass as ψˆ =
ψmax − 2βc, the initial x position as xˆ = Rc(sin(ψmax) −
sin(βc)), and the initial y position as yˆ = Rc(cos(βc) −
cos(ψmax). The longitudinal and lateral distance along this
arc are then
x(t) = Rc(sin(ψˆ)− sin(ψ(t))) + xˆ, (23)
y(t) = Rc(cos(ψ(t))− cos(ψˆ)) + yˆ. (24)
As in Case 1, substituting yc gives us ψc,
ψc = cos
−1
(
1
Rc
(yc − yˆ) + cos(ψˆ)
)
(25)
Substituting this value for ψ in Equation (23) and add d′
gives
xc = Rc(sin(ψˆ)− sin(ψc)) + xˆ+ d′. (26)
Similar to Case 1, we can then compute the clearance time
tc,
tc =
Rc(ψmax − βc + ψˆ − ψc)
v
. (27)
From these longitudinal swerve clearance values, we can
then compute the longitudinal safe distance. To do this, we
can replace the rear braking distance in Equation (4) with
the longitudinal swerve distance xc. In addition, to ensure a
monotonically decreasing gap between the two vehicles, we
set the initial speed of the lead vehicle (as a conservative
approximation) to
v′f = min(vf , vr cos(ψmax)). (28)
The braking distance of the lead vehicle occurs during the
reaction time ρ and the swerve clearance time tc, giving a
front vehicle braking distance of
xf = v
′
f (ρ+ tc)−
amax,brake(ρ+ tc)
2
2
. (29)
Using the parameters amax,accel, ρ introduced in Section II-
A, the longitudinal safe distance between a swerving rear
vehicle and a braking lead vehicle is
ds,b =
[
vrρ+
1
2
amax,accelρ
2 + xc − xf
]
+
+ d′ + d. (30)
Theorem 2. Equation (30) gives a longitudinal safe distance
sufficient for safety when swerving for a braking lead vehicle.
Proof. For t > tc, y(t) > yc, and therefore the swerving
vehicle is no longer longitudinally adjacent to the lead
vehicle, so is safe from the lead vehicle’s braking. For t ≤ tc,
from Equation (28), we use a conservative lower bound for
the speed of the lead vehicle to ensure the lead vehicle’s
speed is less than the swerving vehicle during the entire
swerve. This implies the gap between the two vehicles is
monotonically decreasing. This means the minimum gap
between the two vehicles occurs at time tc.
The swerving vehicle travels xc+vrρ+ 12amax,accelρ
2, and a
conservative lower bound on the lead vehicle’s travel distance
is v′f (ρ + tc) − 12amax,brake(ρ + tc)2. There is at most d′ of
distance from the centre of mass to the front of the swerving
vehicle. Thus, if a swerving vehicle maintains distance ds,b,
it is safe from the lead vehicle at time tc. Since the gap is
monotonically decreasing for t ≤ tc, it is safe ∀t ≤ tc.
C. Braking for a Swerving Vehicle
The longitudinal safe distance required to swerve for a
braking vehicle was computed in the preceding section, and
this section considers the opposite problem, computing the
longitudinal safe distance required to brake for a swerving
lead vehicle without collision. Since the lead vehicle intends
to occupy the other lane, it requires less longitudinal distance
for the rear vehicle to brake to avoid the swerving lead
vehicle than it would for it to brake for a braking lead vehicle.
It is assumed the front vehicle is performing the same swerve
discussed in Section IV-B. To account for rotation of the front
vehicle, d¯ is used to compensate as defined in Section IV-A.
Equations 21, 22, 21, and 27 can be used to compute the
xc and tc for the front vehicle’s swerve. As in Equation 4,
it is assumed that the rear vehicle accelerates maximally
during its reaction time, and then brakes comfortably until
tc. As before, denote the rear vehicle’s post-acceleration
velocity as vr,ρ. Then its minimum velocity during the
braking manoeuvre is
vr,min = max(min(vr, vr,ρ − amin,brake(tc − ρ)), 0). (31)
As in Section IV-B, the proof of safety is simplified if the gap
is monotonically decreasing until lateral safety is reached. To
ensure this, the lead vehicle speed is conservatively bounded
with v′f
v′f = min(vf cos(ψmax), vr,min). (32)
A conservative lower bound for the longitudinal distance
travelled by the swerving front vehicle is then
xf = v
′
f tc. (33)
The distance xf is a lower bound on the distance travelled
by the front vehicle during the swerve that creates a mono-
tonically decreasing gap.
The distance travelled by the rear braking vehicle during
its reactions delay and its braking manoeuvre is denoted
by xr. This distance depends on the clearance time tc,
similar to the distance travelled by the front vehicle in the
preceding section. The distance travelled during the rear
vehicle’s braking manoeuvre, xr,brake, is given by
xr,brake =
vr,ρ(tc − ρ)−
amin,brake(tc−ρ)2
2 , tc − ρ ≤ vr,ρamin,brake ,
v2r,ρ
2amin,brake
, tc − ρ > vr,ρamin,brake .
(34)
Following this, the distance travelled by the braking rear
vehicle is
xr =
(vr + vr,ρ)ρ
2
+ xr,brake. (35)
Using Equations 33 and 35, the longitudinal safe distance
when braking for a swerving vehicle, db,s is then
db,s = [xr − xf ]+ + df + d¯. (36)
Theorem 3. Equation 36 gives a longitudinal safe distance
sufficient for safety when braking for a swerving lead vehicle.
Proof. For t > tc, the swerving vehicle is laterally clear from
the rear braking vehicle, and therefore the rear vehicle is
safe. The velocity used for the lead vehicle is a conservative
lower bound on its true speed ∀t ≤ tc, as per Equation 32. In
addition, v′f ≤ vr, ∀t ≤ tc, and as a result the gap between
the two vehicles is monotonically decreasing on that interval.
The minimum distance between the two vehicles thus occurs
at time tc. Equation 36 thus gives enough clearance such that
no collision occurs at time tc, so the rear vehicle is safe at
time tc. Since the gap is monotonically decreasing over the
interval, the rear vehicle is safe ∀t ≤ tc.
D. Swerving for a Swerving vehicle
The final relevant longitudinal safe distance is the distance
required when swerving behind a swerving lead vehicle. This
is illustrated in Figure 1d. Both vehicles are longitudinally
adjacent during the entire manoeuvre. From Assumption 1,
the lead vehicle will not brake during its swerve. The goal is
then to compute the longitudinal distance required to swerve
behind a lead swerving vehicle, such that if the lead vehicle
were to immediately brake with deceleration amax,accel at
the end of its swerve, and the rear vehicle were to brake
with deceleration amin,accel at the end of its reaction-delayed
swerve, there would be no collision. The swerve completion
times of the rear and front vehicle are given by t1 and t2,
respectively. Similar to the previous section, v′f denotes a
conservative lower bound on the front vehicle’s speed. The
longitudinal safe distance required to swerve in response to
a swerving vehicle, ds,s, is then
ds,s =
vr + vr,ρ
2
ρ+ vr,ρ(t1 − ρ)+
v2r,ρ
2amin,brake
−
(
v′f t2 +
v′2f
2amax,brake
)
+ d′ + d¯. (37)
Theorem 4. Equation 37 gives a longitudinal safe distance
sufficient for safety when swerving for a swerving lead
vehicle.
Proof. The gap between each vehicle can be written as a
piecewise function of time. The endpoints of the intervals
are functions of the reaction delay, ρ, the duration of the
front vehicle’s swerve, t2, the duration of the rear vehicle’s
swerve, t1, the brake time of the front vehicle, tb,2, and the
brake time of the rear vehicle, tb,1. The swerve times for
the kinematic bicycle model for varying speeds are propor-
tional to v cos−1
(
1− 1v2
)
, which is quasi-constant across all
relevant road speeds. In addition, amax,accel > amin,accel, and
swerve times are longer than reasonable reaction times. From
this, it is reasonable to assume that the interval endpoints
are ρ < t2 < ρ + t1 < t2 + tb,2 < ρ + t1 + tb,1. Denote
the longitudinal distance travelled during the swerves by the
front and rear vehicle as xs,2(t) and xs,1(t) respectively, the
initial gap between the vehicles by g0, and the gap between
the vehicles as g(t).
The maximum longitudinal velocity during the rear vehicle
swerve is vr,ρ. If the maximum ψ value during the front
vehicles swerve is denoted ψmax,f , the minimum longitu-
dinal velocity during the front vehicle’s swerve is given
by vf cos(ψmax,f ). Set v′f = min(vf cos(ψmax,f ), vr). This
means that
xs,1(t) ≤ vr,ρt, (38)
xs,2(t) ≥ v′f t. (39)
Using Equations (38) and (39) as conservative bounds on
the distance travelled by both vehicles during the swerve
manoeuvre results in a monotonically decreasing function of
t, gˆ(t), with the property that gˆ(t) ≤ g(t),∀t.
This implies that the minimum of gˆ(t) occurs for t > tb,1,
where gˆ(t) is constant
min
t
gˆ(t) = g0 + v
′
f t2 +
v′2f
2amax,brake
−(
vr + vr,ρ
2
ρ+ vr,ρt1 +
v2r,ρ
2amin,brake
)
. (40)
Since gˆ(t) ≤ g(t),∀t, if gˆ(t) ≥ 0,∀t, no collision occurs.
This is satisfied if the initial gap satisfies
g0 ≥ vr + vr,ρ
2
ρ+ vr,ρt1 +
v2r,ρ
2amin,brake
−(
v′f t2 +
v′2f
2amax,brake
)
. (41)
By adding in the distances from the centre of mass to the
ends of the chassis, compensating for the rotation of each
swerving vehicle, an initial gap is sufficient for safety ∀t if
g0 ≥ vr + vr,ρ
2
ρ+ vr,ρt1 +
v2r,ρ
2amin,brake
−(
v′f t2 +
v′2f
2amax,brake
)
+ d′ + d¯. (42)
Which yields Equation 37.
At t ≥ t2, the time at which the lead vehicle begins hard
braking, there is enough longitudinal distance to brake for
the leading vehicle, as gˆ(t) ≥ 0,∀t ≥ t2, so the rear vehicle
is safe. Since gˆ(t) is monotonically decreasing with respect
to t, the safe longitudinal distance is satisfied for t < t2, and
thus the rear vehicle is safe ∀t.
E. Universal Following Distance
The final subproblem addressed in this paper aims to
combine the results of the previous sections into a final
following distance that can be maintained by all vehicles
in a given straight road system to ensure universal safety,
assuming the vehicles can brake or swerve as a response to
the behaviour of other vehicles in front of them. In this sense,
this section extends the analysis of the preceding sections
into the case of more than two vehicles in a road system.
Each vehicle’s following distance will be a function of the
speed of the vehicle, as well as the speed of the 2 vehicles in
front of the vehicle, and the parameters outlined in Section II-
A. Denote the distance required to brake for a braking lead
vehicle as db,b(vr, vf , ρ), the distance required to swerve for
a braking lead vehicle as db,s(vr, vf , ρ), the distance required
to swerve for a braking lead vehicle as ds,b(vr, vf , ρ), and
the distance required to swerve for a swerving lead vehicle
as ds,s(vr, vf , ρ).
(a)
(b)
Fig. 5: (a) Scenario where the rear vehicle must swerve for a
swerving vehicle 2 cars ahead. (b) Scenario where the rear vehicle
must brake for a braking vehicle 2 cars ahead.
In such a road system, there will be blocks of vehicles
where the front vehicle in the block is much farther away
from the nearest vehicle in front of it than both db,b and ds,s.
Since it is at least this far, it can safely brake or swerve
for any vehicle in front of it, and therefore any vehicle in
front of it can be ignored. Because of this, these blocks
can be considered in isolation, and if each block of vehicles
is considered safe, then all vehicles in the road system are
considered safe. For any vehicle in a given block, denote its
speed by v1, and the speeds of the first and second vehicles
in front of it (if they exist within the block) as v2 and v3,
respectively. The longitudinal position of each vehicle as a
function of time is denoted by x1(t), x2(t), and x3(t). A
sufficient safe following distance for each vehicle is then
dˆlong = max(db,s(v1, v2, ρ), db,s(v1, v2, ρ),
ds,s(v1, v3, 2ρ)− ds,b(v2, v3, ρ),
db,b(v1, v3, 2ρ)− ds,b(v2, v3, ρ)). (43)
Theorem 5. Equation 43 gives a longitudinal safe distance
sufficient for universal safety when maintained by all vehi-
cles.
Proof. As mentioned earlier, each block of vehicles can be
analyzed individually for safety, and if every block is safe,
all vehicles are safe. The safety of any given block can be
proved using an inductive argument across all of the vehicles,
starting from the front of the block. The following is a proof
sketch.
• For the base case, the safety of the first two vehicles is
proven when following with at least dˆlong.
• For the inductive step, it is assumed the ith agent is
following with at least dˆlong and is safe, and it is shown
that if the (i+1)th agent follows with at least dˆlong, then
it is safe.
1) Base Case: The first vehicle at the front of the block is
by definition at least db,b and ds,s from any vehicle in front of
it (if such a vehicle exists). As a result, any potential vehicle
in front of the first can be safely avoided if necessary with
either a brake or a swerve. This means that the first vehicle
in the block is safe, and any potential vehicle in front of the
first can be safely ignored by all vehicles in the block.
The second vehicle follows the first vehicle at dˆlong. If the
front vehicle brakes, the second vehicle is at least ds,b away
from it, and can swerve to safety. If the front vehicle swerves,
the second vehicle is at least db,s away from it, and can brake
safely. The second vehicle will therefore not collide with the
first vehicle, and is therefore safe.
2) Induction: Now, suppose the ith vehicle is following
with at least dˆlong of distance, and is safe from the vehicles in
front of it. Denote the (i+1)th as vehicle 1, the ith vehicle as
vehicle 2, and the (i−1)th vehicle as vehicle 3. The distance
between vehicle 1 and vehicle 2 is dˆlong. If vehicle 2 brakes
or swerves, vehicle 1 is at least ds,b and db,s away from it,
and is safe from vehicle 2 if it responds with a swerve or
brake, respectively.
If vehicle 1 swerves in response to vehicle 2’s brake, there
are 2 cases to consider. The first case is if vehicle 3 was
braking. Since vehicle 2 was assumed to be safe from vehicle
3, x2(t) ≤ x3(t),∀t. Combining this with the fact that ds,b
is sufficient for vehicle 1 to swerve safely from vehicle 2,
vehicle 1 must be safe from vehicle 3 if vehicle 3 brakes.
If vehicle 3 was swerving, ds,s(v1, v3, 2ρ) is a sufficient
distance for vehicle 1 to follow vehicle 3 to ensure safety.
This case is illustrated in Figure 5a. The reaction delay
is doubled to account for the reaction propagating through
2 vehicles instead of the usual one. Since vehicle 2 was
assumed to be safe from vehicle 3, ds,b(v2, v3, ρ) is a lower
bound on vehicle 2’s following distance from vehicle 3. This
means that in this case, ds,s(v1, v3, 2ρ) − ds,b(v2, v3, ρ) is
a sufficient following distance between vehicle 1 and 2 to
guarantee safety.
If vehicle 1 brakes in response to vehicle 2’s swerve, as
before there are 2 cases to consider. The first case is if vehicle
3 was swerving. As before, since vehicle 2 was assumed to
be safe from vehicle 3, x2(t) ≤ x3(t),∀t. Combining this
with the fact that db,s is sufficient for vehicle 1 to brake safely
from vehicle 2’s swerve, vehicle 1 must be safe from vehicle
3’s swerve.
If vehicle 3 was braking, db,b(v1, v3, 2ρ) is a sufficient
distance for vehicle 1 to follow vehicle 3 to ensure safety.
This case is illustrated in Figure 5b. Again, the reaction delay
is doubled to account for propagation between two vehicles.
Since vehicle 2 was assumed to be safe from vehicle 3,
ds,b(v2, v3, ρ) is again a lower bound on vehicle 2’s following
distance. Thus, in this case, db,b(v1, v3, 2ρ) − ds,b(v2, v3, ρ)
is a sufficient following distance between vehicle 1 and 2 to
guarantee safety.
Since dˆlong is greater or equal to each of these following
distances, vehicle 1 is safe, and thus the (i + 1)th is safe.
By induction, any block of vehicles where each vehicle
maintains the following distance given in Equation (43) is
safe, and as a result, the entire system is safe.
At high speeds, this new following distance can be used to
allow for tighter following between agents. At low speeds,
the agents can revert to the braking following distance used
in RSS.
If the positions of vehicles 2 and 3, d2 and d3 respectively,
are known as well as their speeds, the following distance can
be improved further. If we denote d2,3 = d3−d2, then by the
same logic in the preceding proof, a sufficient longitudinal
safe distance is
dˆlong = max(db,s(v1, v2, ρ), db,s(v1, v2, ρ),
ds,s(v1, v3, 2ρ)− d2,3, db,b(v1, v3, 2ρ)− d2,3). (44)
A comparison between the RSS following distance and
these new following distances across a range of speeds is
shown in Figure 8. In the plot, all vehicles are moving at the
same speed. Since d2,3 can vary, for illustration purposes we
assume each vehicle follows the agent in front of it at
dˆlong = max(db,s(v1, v2, ρ), db,s(v1, v2, ρ),
ds,s(v1, v3, 2ρ)
2
,
db,b(v1, v3, 2ρ)
2
). (45)
This results in a uniform following distance across all agents
when they are moving at the same speed.
V. VALIDATION AND RESULTS
To validate our bicycle model assumptions, we first check
the validity of our conservative upper bound on the required
swerve distance by computing a lower bound. We then use
a dynamic vehicle model [7] to see if our computed swerve
distances are reasonable approximations. The lower bound
is computed and compared to the upper bound distance, as
well as the relevant braking distance, in Section V-A. In
Section V-B, we compare our swerve clearance distance,
as computed in Section IV-B, to swerves from the dynamic
model.
A. Lower Bound Validation
To compute a lower bound on the longitudinal swerve
clearance distance xc, we use the particle model in Equa-
tion (6). We set the minimum ax and maximum ay values
to be −amin,brake and alatmin, respectively, from the bicycle
model. This ensures that any acceleration possible under the
bicycle model is also possible under the particle model.
For a particle model, maximal lateral acceleration towards
yc as well as maximal longitudinal deceleration leads to
lateral clearance in the shortest longitudinal distance x¯c [14].
Thus, we have that x¯c ≤ xc for any other manoeuvre feasible
for the particle model.
Finally, for computing the clearance, we use an inner
approximation of the vehicle’s chassis during rotation. To
do so, we use the square inscribed on the circle of radius
bl centred on the centre of mass with side length 2d′i. This
is shown in Figure 3b. Through this inner approximation,
we have that d′i ≤ d′ for any possible chassis rotation.
This implies that anything the chassis can clear during the
swerve will be cleared by the inner square. If we use xf
as in Section IV-B, a lower bound on the longitudinal safe
distance, denoted by d¯long, is given by
d¯long = vrρ+
1
2
amax,accelρ
2 + x¯c − xf . (46)
Theorem 6. Equation (46) gives a longitudinal safe distance
necessary for safety when swerving for a braking lead
vehicle.
Proof. The clearance time and associated longitudinal dis-
tance at which point the particle model reaches yc are given
by
tc =
√
2yc
alatmin
, x¯c = vtc − amin,braket
2
c
2
+ d′i. (47)
By the acceleration constraints imposed on the particle
model, any feasible acceleration in the bicycle model is
feasible for the particle model. In addition, the manoeuvre
is optimal with respect to longitudinal distance travelled for
the particle model. Both of these points imply that the x¯c in
Equation (47) is a lower bound on any feasible xc for the
bicycle model. Next, the inner approximation implies that
for any manoeuvre, if the chassis can clear, the square with
side length 2d′i can clear as well, allowing a buffer of d
′
i to
be added.
If we denote the initial longitudinal distance between
the vehicles as x2, then the distance between the swerving
vehicle and the braking vehicle during the reaction delay is
given by x2−d′i−dr+vf t− 12amax,braket2−vrt− 12amaxt2. If
we denote the distance between the vehicles at the end of the
reaction delay as xρ, then after the reaction delay the distance
between the vehicles is given by xρ + vf t− 12amax,braket2−
vr,ρt +
1
2amin,braket
2. Since −amax,brake − amax < 0 and
−amax,brake + amin,brake < 0, the distance between the
swerving and braking vehicle is concave on both intervals.
This implies that the minimum gap occurs at the boundaries
of the time intervals {0, ρ, tc}. Since the distance between the
vehicles is differentiable everywhere, the time ρ is a critical
point only if the derivative is zero. In this case, since the
distance is concave before and after time ρ, the derivative
is positive for t < ρ and negative for t > ρ, implying the
distance at time ρ is a local maximum. Taking everything
together, assuming the vehicles are not already in collision
at t = 0, this implies that Equation (46) is a lower bound on
the longitudinal safe distance required for a swerve feasible
for the bicycle model.
A comparison between the lower bound and upper bound
on the longitudinal distance travelled during a swerve, as well
as the equivalent braking distance, is shown in Figure 6. The
plot is across a range of initial speeds.
Fig. 6: A comparison of the longitudinal distance travelled between
swerve and brake manoeuvres, for varying initial velocities. For
very low speeds the dynamic model swerves behave poorly and are
omitted.
B. Dynamic Model Validation
Next, we verify that our kinematic approximation is valid
by comparing the longitudinal swerve distance under a
dynamic model to the distance computed in the preceding
sections. We analyze both the cases when the dynamic
model is constrained by amin,brake and alatmin, and when it
is not. We wish to show that our acceleration constrained
bicycle model swerve distances bound the swerve manoeuvre
distances of a dynamic model employing both swerving and
braking whose accelerations are unconstrained by comfort,
but instead constrained by feasibility. We would also like to
see at which speeds the constrained kinematic bicycle swerve
distance is close to the dynamic model swerve distance when
the dynamic model is constrained by comfort. We focus on
the ability of the dynamic model to swerve, and not an
associated controller, and as a result generate the manoeuvres
in open loop. However, doing a grid search over all possible
control inputs to find the best swerves is impractical. Instead,
we assume that the steering input is broken into 4 equal
length intervals of time, and perform binary search over
steering rate magnitudes until the boundary conditions in
Equation (12) are satisfied. In addition, we also perform
linear search over brake input and the total time of the
manoeuvre and select the manoeuvre that minimizes the
longitudinal swerve distance xc. Note that these generated
swerves are not optimal for the dynamic model, but are
feasible.
The parameters used in our validation are summarized in
Table I. We chose amin,brake to represent braking at the limit
of comfort, and amax,brake was chosen to represent a hard,
uncomfortable brake. The swerves generated for various
initial speeds are illustrated in Figure 7.
TABLE I: Parameters Table
m 1239 kg lf 1.19 m lr 1.37 m
Izz 1752 kg · m2 eSP 0.5 m R 0.302 m
cw 0.3 ρdrag 1.25
kg
m3 A 1.438
Bf 10.96 Cf 1.3 Df 4560.4
Ef -0.5 Br 12.67 Cr 1.3
Dr 3947.81 Er -0.5 alatmax 4.0
m
s2
alatmin 2.0
m
s2 amin,brake 2.0
m
s2 µ 0.1 m
amax,accel 2.0 ms2 amax,brake 8.0
m
s2 ρ 0.1 s
α 3.7 m dr 2.3 m df 2.4 m
br 0.9 m bl 0.9 m δmax pi6
Using these computed swerves, we then compute the
lateral clearance distance yc as before and find the longi-
tudinal swerve distance travelled xc that occurs at time tc.
Substituting this value in at Equations (30) and (36) then
gives the required longitudinal safe distance for the dynamic
model. For the range of initial vehicle speeds where swerving
is more efficient than braking, the longitudinal safe distances
required for the dynamic model are plotted and compared to
those computed in Section IV in Figure 6.
Fig. 7: The swerve manoeuvres generated according to the dynamic
model. Each swerve is for a different initial speed in the interval
[10, 30] ms . The arrows denote the heading of the vehicle.
C. Simulation Results
In Figure 6, we compare the braking distance and the
swerve longitudinal distance travelled when avoiding a sta-
tionary object. This plot illustrates the advantage of swerves;
for initial rear vehicle speeds greater than 8 ms , the swerves
reach safety using less longitudinal distance than braking
does. We note that as amin,brake is increased, the crossover
point of velocity where swerves become advantageous in-
creases as well. However, due to the quadratic nature of
the braking distance, swerves always eventually become
more advantageous at high speeds. From the figure, we can
see that when the accelerations of the dynamic model are
constrained, the swerve distance of the kinematic model
is a reasonable approximation of the dynamic model, with
error between 0.7-7.7%, which is reasonable to expect for a
kinematic approximation [18]. In the case where the dynamic
model is unconstrained by comfort (only by feasibility), the
longitudinal swerve distance required is within 15.6-24.0%
error of the upper bound distance of the kinematic model, and
is completely bracketed by the kinematic upper and lower
bounds across a range of speeds from 8-30 ms . This shows
that our acceleration constrained kinematic approximation
can accurately approximate the swerve distance required by
the constrained dynamic single-track model up to mid-ranged
initial speeds, and can bound the swerve distance required
by the unconstrained dynamic model across the entire range
of speeds.
In Figure 8, the universal safe following distance required
as clearance when using swerves is compared to the braking
following distance, as amin,brake is varied from 2, 3, and
4 ms2 . In these plots, all vehicles are moving at an equal
speed, displayed on the x-axis. These plots show that as the
speeds of the vehicles increase, the following distance de-
creases when allowing swerve manoeuvres, when compared
to braking alone. As amin,brake increases, the speeds where
swerves become more effective also increases. For increasing
amin,brake of 2, 3, and 4 ms2 , these speeds are 8.1, 11.4, and
14.6 ms , respectively. The universal following distance is also
reduced by up to 42% across all 3 values of amin,brake when
using swerves as opposed to braking alone.
Fig. 8: The universal following distance required for safety when
amin,brake is 2, 3, and 4 ms2 .
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we outlined a method for extending the
RSS framework to include swerve manoeuvres in addition
to the standard brake manoeuvre available in the frame-
work. We proved the safety of these manoeuvres under a
set of reasonable assumptions about responsible behaviour,
while incorporating the original assumptions in the RSS
framework. This extended framework results in a significant
reduction in following distance at high speeds. In addition,
the kinematic model was shown to conservatively bound the
longitudinal distance required for swerves executed for the
dynamic model.
In future work, we would like to extend the inclusion
of swerve manoeuvres to more general cases. One option
would be to generalize the swerve manoeuvre to arbitrary
Frenet frames, as opposed to straight lines. One could also
compute bounds on the error from using a straight line
approximation to the Frenet frame. Further experimental
work of the RSS framework and its extensions, through on-
car testing or scenario simulation, would also be beneficial.
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